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INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT 
Appellee requests the appellate court to reflexively deny Appellant an appeal of right premised 
upon Appellee's perceived, but misrepresentative, procedural deficiencies in 
Appellant/petitioner's Brief and upon an assertion that because the lower court has broad 
equitable discretion concerning property division in a divorce that the lower court may 
arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably decline to follow precedent that is well-regarded 
through antiquity. 
Appellees' Brief actually discloses Appellee seeks to oppose the appeal without an actual 
counter-statement of the facts in her Brief and concedes a deliberate decision to avoid addressing 
the appeal on the substantive merits. See Appellee's Brief, Argument, A., p 3 
Appellee presently relies solely on procedural issues, just as Appellee avoided substantive 
objections to the facts in the Appellant's URAP 11(g) statement of facts filed with the lower 
court, notwithstanding that the Appellee dilatorily and erroneously objected only about 
procedural circumstances already decided by the Court of Appeals against Appellee, thus 
waiving any objection to the facts posed by Appellant in the lower court for use on appeal where 
Appellee failed to object to those facts within the URAP 11(g) ten day time limit for factual 
objection after service. 
THE URAP 24(A)(9) MARSHALLING REQUIREMENT 
URAP 24(a)(9) states: 
An argument.... A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding. 
However, the Rule does not specify the form or forms of organization by which the appellate 
court may be informed about such factual information from the perspective that favors Appellee 
and the task is left to the reasonable interpretation of the Appellant. URCP 1 would require 
URAP 24 (a)(9) to be construed to promote a just determination of the appeal of right, not to 
deprive the indigent appellant of the substantive appeal as Appellee urges. The Rule by its terms 
applies where the appeal relies primarily on a challenge to the factual underpinnings of the 
decision of the lower court. 
ESTATE OF ASHTON v ASHTON, 898 P2d 824 (Ut App 1995) teaches where an appellant 
does not challenge factual findings and pursues an appeal based on the application of the law to 
the facts regarding the disposition of joint property, the appellate court may assume that the 
record supports the factual findings of the trial court and proceed with the appeal. Citing Ohline 
Corp v Granite Mill, 849 P2d 602, 604 (Ut App 1993). 1 
Where, unlike the appeal taken here, a brief of an appellant wholly fails to meet the briefing 
requirements of URAP 24(a)(9) and makes no attempt to marshal the evidence or to cite to 
documents or exhibits in the record or any authority and contains no argument concerning the 
actions of the trial court and the appellate court is simply made a depository onto which the 
appealing party attempts to dump the burden of argument and research with a mere four page 
statement of facts, absent supporting legal authority, only then is rejection of the appeal 
warranted. State v Larsen, 828 P2d 487, 491 (Ut App 1992) (citation omitted), affd, > 865 P.2d 
1355 (Ut 1993), Phillips v Hatfield, 904 P2d 1108, 1109 (Ut.App 1995); see also Walker v 
United States Gen., Inc., 916 P .2d 903, 908 (Ut 1996) (declining to address issue when 
appellant's brief "wholly fail[s] to cite to the record or to cite a single case in support of the 
contention"). 
As Appellant indicated in his brief, such factual findings regarding the disputed property division 
and supporting the decision are marshaled, organized and contained in the Decree. Appellant's 
Brief, Statement of the Case, p 2, Appellant's Appendix, pp 3-11. Appellee's Decree organizes 
and incorporates verbatim, albeit redundantly and unnecessarily, the same facts also set forth 
again in her Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law below and that states those facts in a light 
most favorable to the decision that the Appellee self-servingly provided to the district court and 
which the court endorsed as indicative of the basis for its decision in the Decree. 
Contrary to Appellee's erroneous assertion that Appellant only presented those facts favorable to 
his position, Appellant cites the facts succinctly found and stated in the Decree, but what is more 
appeals the erroneous legal conclusion that the district court deduced from those facts and also 
provides the appellate court the unrebutted facts in the record that the district court overlooked in 
reaching its decision contrary to law. 
Under circumstances where the appeal relies on the lower court's misapplication of legal and 
equitable principles to the facts, incorporating to the facts cited in the Decree alone is sufficient 
to satisfy the West Valley City v Majestic, 818 P2d 1311 organizational standard that an 
appellant provide the appellate court with the facts found by the district court before ferreting out 
the fatal factual flaws. It is Appellant's position that the imperfections in this case hinge on a 
legal and equitable errors, but still Appellant also augmented the findings of fact stated in the 
Decree, in support that decision, with the URCP 11(g) Statement of Facts, as discussed supra. 
Since Appellant is impecunious and could not sustain the cost of transcripts, a Motion, re: 
Transcripts was filed with the appellate court requesting that Appellant be allowed to rely on 
specific references to portions of the videotape of the trial by date and exact time recorded in the 
1
 The Ashtons held properties that each brought into the marriage, as well as after-acquired 
trial videotapes. The appellate court ordered that at Appellant could instead resort to URAP 
11(g). Appellant marshaled the material facts by reference to the videotapes of the trial and trial 
exhibits, which sources were the URAP 11(g) "best means available," and filed them in the 
district court in compliance with URAP 11(g). This alternative to a transcript, among other 
exhibits and documents in the court's file, constitutes the marshalling or organization of the 
record on appeal. 
The facts in the Decree upon which the decision purports to be grounded are also contained 
throughout the Statement of Facts in Appellant's Brief, but are stated more completely and are 
augmented by other unrebutted facts entered below, as well as additional facts entered as 
evidence at trial, all of which are also duplicatively included in the URAP 11 (g) statement filed 
in the district court. 
Appellee, however, waived a URAP 11(g) objection by failing to timely cite any particular 
contradiction of the facts that Appellant proposed for settlement. This contravened the Rule 
11(g) ten day deadline, although the record below indicates that Appellee/respondent retained 
two attorneys in the trial court. Consistent with Appellee's approach lately in her Brief, the 
belated objection that Appellee eventually filed out of time in the trial court avoided 
contradiction of any fact contained in Appellant's proposed statement of facts, and instead 
Appellee irrelevantly relied on immaterial procedural issues regarding timeliness that were 
previously resolved in Appellant's favor in the appellate court. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Appellee's Brief repetitively, but erroneously, asserts Appellant's 
lack of reference in Appellant's Brief to the trial transcript, even though Appellant uses the same 
the statement of facts submitted pursuant to URAP 11 (g) and also equally relies on trial exhibits 
property, as joint tenants. 
regarding the property division also marshaled by concrete references in Appellant's brief that 
are provided in the Appellant's Appendix as relevant to real and other substantial property that 
was divided by the court. 
Moreover, Appellee's Statement of Facts, just as Appellee's belated objection below, reveals that 
while Appellee for effect vaguely purports to disagree with Appellant's Statement of Facts, 
Appellee again fails to disclose to the appellate court any particular fact in the Statement of Facts 
in Appellant's Brief to which Appellee takes exception. 
Appellant does not merely challenge the sufficiency of the evidence set forth as the district 
court's findings, Appellant, like Ashton, contends that the decision is so lacking in legal support 
and is offensive to the law, logic and fundamental fairness as to be manifestly unjust, 
notwithstanding the facts found in the light most favorable to Appellee in the Decree. Utah Med. 
Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P2d 228, 233 (Utah 1998). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IS MERITORIOUS, THE ISSUES PRESENTED ABOUT 
JUDICIAL REVIEW ARE VITAL TO THE JURISPRUDENCE OF UTAH AND THE 
APPEAL OF RIGHT SHOULD NOT BE REJECTED ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS 
The Ashton case illustrates that where an appeal of right turns on an application of law the 
appeal should not be rejected on a procedural grounds regarding the factual presentation. Equity 
must follow the law, notwithstanding the district court's broad discretion, to be fair and a 
departure from the law violates equal protection and encourages a lack of faith in the fairness of 
the judicial system as a forum in which justice is administered equally. 2 
To act arbitrarily from case to case sets harmful precedent for the citizens of Utah who live 
together for many years, who work for a common objective, who eventually solemnize their 
2
 The basic rule as to the division of properties is that the court should make such orders in 
relation to property as may be equitable. Martinett v Martinett, 331 P2d 821. 
cohabitation by marriage and who take real property as joint tenants while making monetary and 
personal contributions to a family business that utilizes the joint property but who later cannot 
rely on the deeds that made joint tenancies in real properties should one of the parties 
subsequently decide to break the marriage contract, move in with another, file for divorce and 
seek to take all the joint property interests, as was the case instantly. Even in cases where a joint 
tenancy in real property is dissolved by the actions of one of the parties, married or otherwise, an 
equal right to the property remains as tenants in common. 3 
Put more simply, a party to a contract who breaches the agreement on a caprice because they no 
longer wish to be restrained from pursuing other personal interests elsewhere cannot in good 
faith request the court of equity to ignore the breach and award all the joint property acquired 
pursuant to the agreement to the them in spite of the personal services performed by the non-
breaching party in furtherance of the contractual objective. A marriage is a heightened 
contractual agreement pursuant to which good faith acquisitions of real estate by the parties is 
not merely elevated by the four unities of joint tenancy (time, title, equality of interest and 
possession), but also by the additional unity of the marriage that solemnized the relationship. 4 
Ashton, supra, p 824 held when title to property is taken in joint tenancy, a presumption arises 
that the title holders intended to create a valid joint tenancy and a party challenging the validity 
of a joint tenancy bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that at the time 
title was taken there was no intention to create a valid joint tenancy. Citing Spader v Newbold, 
29 Utah 2d 433, 435, 511 P2d 153, 154 (1973); Culley v Culley, 17 Utah 2d 62, 63, 404 P.2d 
3
 Even should a joint tenant take steps to conclude the joint tenancy ownership of real 
property, a tenancy in common would still result with each party or spouse retaining a one-half 
interest. Estate ofBreckon v Tax Comm'n, 591 P2d 442, 443 (Ut 1979). 
657,658(1965); See 48A CJ.S. Joint Tenancy S 3 (1981). Instantly the lower court's factual 
findings were insufficient to establish that earlier the Appellee did not intend to gift to Appellant 
a one-half joint interest in the Boulder and Midway acreage when the interest was taken or that 
Appellee did not intend to create a joint interest with the Appellant as a donee.5 
For an example about why this appeal should proceed on the legal and equitable grounds, as did 
Ashton, since the court decided the 20 acres in Allegheny, California acquired shortly before the 
relationship of the parties was solemnized in marriage and that was deeded solely into 
respondent's name, should be sold, any associated debt be paid and any remaining value be split 
evenly between the parties, fundamental rationality and fairness likewise requires that the lower 
court be consistent and that the 100 acres in Boulder, Utah that was acquired after the marriage 
and that was deliberately taken as husband and wife in a joint tenancy since Appellee had no will 
that favored Appellant and she wished to avoid probate and estate tax, should likewise be sold, 
associated debts be paid, and any value remaining be split evenly between the parties. 
Where Appellee testified that she intended to give a 1/2 interest in the Boulder acreage to the 
Appellant consistency requires this gift, into which the Appellee continued to make monetary 
4
 A joint tenancy contains the four essential unities of time, title, interest, and possession. 
Tracy-Collins Trust Co. v Goeltz, 5 Utah 2d 350, 356-57, 301 P.2d 1086, 1089-90 (1956), II 
American Law of Property S 6.2, at 8-9 (1952). 
5
 The trial court's findings must be adequate to support its ultimate conclusion as to the 
dispositon of joint tenancy property that a party claims was not intended to be so. Durfee v 
Durfee, 796 P2d 713, 717 (Ut App 1990) (holding that findings must be adequate to demonstrate 
that trial court considered relevant factors in making its ultimate conclusion), Rasband v 
Rasband, 752 P2d 1331, 1333-34 (Ut App 1988) (Findings must demonstrate that the court's 
decision logically follows from the facts before it.) 
contributions while she was satisfied with the marital relationship, could not be taken back 
subsequently when Appellee decided she was no longer interested in the marriage relationship. 
Equity cannot ignore settled property law regarding the division into equal tenancies in common 
of a joint tenancy in real property, 6 notwithstanding the district court demonstrated favoritism 
toward the female party in the marriage relationship. This principle is underscored by the legal 
requirement that a party challenging the validity of a joint tenancy bears the burden of the clear 
and convincing evidence standard referenced in the Spader and Culley cases supra. 
Similarly, as another example of why division of joint interests should be settled by precedent, 
the parties remained amicably married in 1998 and inarguably they filed joint income tax returns 
since 1996. Legally each party as husband and wife filing jointly is entitled to half of the total 
refund for 1998. However, since Appellant firmly decided subsequent to April 15, 1999 that she 
no longer wished to be married to Appellant, she decided after the tax returns were due and later 
still after she pursued the divorce that she wanted the outstanding tax refunds divided as if the 
parties were already divorced prior to the conclusion of the return due date. Equitably the 
amounts of these returns should be evenly split, but the court unfairly decided otherwise. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The issue of whether parties to an intimate relationship, that they eventually solemnized in 
marriage while working toward a common goal that included a family business venture that 
utilized jointly acquired real property, can trust that they will receive an equal one-half share of 
those joint interests acquired during the marriage, or during prior cohabitation, in pursuant of 
their common interests or goals, is important. Posed another way, why should a party to a joint 
6
 Even where a judicial sale of one tenant's interest involuntarily severs a joint tenancy by conveyance to a 
third party, a tenancy in common remains regarding the interest of the other co-tenant. Jolley v Corry, 671 P2d 139 
(Ut 1983); 20 Am.Jur.2d Co-tenancy, Sec 21 (1965).. 
tenancy in real property be deprived of an equal interest when the tenancy is dissolved merely 
because that party is married to the other co-tenant who made the gift? Citizens of Utah deserve 
a bright line standard on which they can rely when creating a joint tenancies in real property in 
anticipation of the continuation of an extended intimate relationship and/or when such an interest 
in real property is taken jointly subsequent to solemnization of the relationship by marriage. 
Simply when one takes a gift from outside of the marriage and places it in a joint tenancy with a 
spouse, instead of keeping the gift solely in one's name, the gift is owned equally by the spouses 
if the gift is received in a joint tenancy in names of both. The party breaching the marriage vows, 
or agreement, should not be able to void the equality of the joint tenancy, or of the resulting 
tenancy in common, because the marriage relationship soured well after the tenancy was created. 
A gift is made when the donor intends that some title, either legal or equitable, should pass and 
some act or acts which indicate the intention to pass title occur. Christensen v Ogden State 
Bank, 286 P 638; Wood v Wood, 49 P2d 416. Hence once one deliberately makes a gift to 
another the donor cannot equivocate later and demand the return of the gift, especially where 
delivery is made by a deed that is filed in the registry. That the donee is a spouse does not void 
this commonly understood maxim. 
Appellant posits that some citizens in the 21st Century, like these litigants in better times, ratify 
prior property acquisitions obtained during cohabitation before solemnizing the relationship with 
a subsequent marriage. For instance, although it would have been fraudulent for the litigants 
prior to marriage to take the Midway 37.77 acreage by deed in joint tenancy as husband and 
wife, Appellee testified that she still wished to take this real property to favor Appellant so she 
deeded the property into a joint tenancy with Appellant. 
A party to a marriage should enjoy the security of good faith reliance on settled property law 
when a spouse during better times favors them with gifts of personal or real property interests. 
This appeal should proceed to establish more definite precedent so married and cohabitative 
citizens of Utah can accurately anticipate the effect of their personal life on their financial affairs. 
The issue regarding the standard of review distills to whether, given the facts taken in the light 
most favorable to Appellee, the lower court decisions regarding the division of the marital assets 
and real property follow the law and whether each was internally logical, consistent and 
equitable. Should the appellate court be impressed with the manifest injustice of the manner in 
which the district court capriciously and erroneously favored the Appellee, contrary to property 
law, the decision should be reversed and the case remanded with guiding instructions. Citizens 
would benefit from the setting of definitive precedent which can be relied upon rather than being 
frustrated by the vagaries of whim, caprice or discrimination regarding decisions like those 
instantly that demean a uniform and reasoned application of law manifesting equal protection. 
Finally regarding Appellee's assertions regarding the standard of review, in STATE v WALKER, 
743 P2d 191, 193 (Ut 1987) the Supreme Court, citing Rule 52(a), recognized that more relative 
deference is owed to jury panel decisions rather than to single-judge findings. 
The lower court's departure from law is an inequitable miscarriage of justice and should be 
reversed and remanded for correction. 
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